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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
v. ] 
ERNEST SINJU, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
• Case No. 980030-CA 
( Oral Argument Priority 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a conviction of arranging the distribution of a controlled 
substance in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) and -8(4) (1998). This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court adduce a sufficient factual basis to support acceptance of 
defendant's guilty plea to the second degree felony offense of arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance within a drug free zone? 
The question of whether the facts adduced by the trial court are sufficient to 
support defendant's guilty plea is a question of law that should be reviewed for 
correctness. See generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932. 936-38 (Utah 1QQ4) However, 
Utah's appellate court's have made clear that a defendant challenging the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting his conviction must carry the burden of 1) marshaling all of the 
evidence supporting his conviction and 2) demonstrating why the evidence was legally 
insufficient to support a conviction. See generally State v. Mincv, 838 P.2d 648, 652 
(Utah App. 1992). In keeping with that standard, defendant has marshaled all of the facts 
adduced by the trial court in support of defendant's guilty plea and has argued that those 
facts are insufficient to support the acceptance of defendant's guilty plea to the charged 
offense. 
2. Did the trial court act within its discretion when it denied defendant's timely 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea? The decision of whether to grant or deny a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Forsvth. 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1998): 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
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consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute^] . . . 
The text of any other pertinent provisions is included as warranted in the 
Argument Section of this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of criminal solicitation of 
aggravated murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§76-4-203, 76-
4-204 and 76-5-202 (1998); one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated murder, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§76-4-201, 76-4-202 and 76-5-202; and 
one count of arranging to distribute a controlled substance (marijuana), in a drug free 
zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) and 58-
37-8(4) (1998) (R. 1). On October 31, 1997, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the 
charge of arranging to distribute a controlled substance in a drug free zone as charged in 
count III of the information (R. 22). The remaining charges against defendant were 
dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement (R. 22; R. 71 at 16-7). A copy of the transcript of 
the October 31, 1997 change of plea hearing is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
On November 21, 1997, defendant, acting pro se, filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea (R. 27), which was followed on November 25, 1997 by a motion to withdraw 
defendant's guilty plea that was filed by defendant's appointed counsel (R. 29). Neither 
defendant nor his appointed counsel filed a memorandum supporting defendant's motion, 
and the State did not file a response. In its December 12, 1997 Judgment and Order of 
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Probation, the trial court noted that "The defendant questioned his motion to change his 
plea. The Court denied the motion" (R. 31). Defendant, again acting pro se, filed a 
timely notice of appeal, but mistakenly sent it to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 35). The 
Court of Appeals received defendant's notice of appeal on December 18, 1997 and 
forwarded it to the trial court (R. 35). Defendant's notice was filed in the trial court on 
December 29, 1997, well within the thirty day time limit for filing a notice of appeal from 
the trial court's judgment of December 12, 1997 (R. 35). Defendant retained current 
counsel on March 18, 1998. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Because defendant challenges the factual basis supporting his guilty plea, the 
undisputed facts appearing in the record are incorporated into the Argument section of 
this brief in conjunction with defendant's explanation of why those facts are legally 
insufficient to support the trial court's acceptance of defendant's guilty plea. 
A copy of the transcript of the October 31, 1997 change of plea hearing is attached 
hereto as Addendum A. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's conviction should be reversed because the facts adduced in support of 
defendant's guilty plea are inadequate to support his second degree felony conviction for 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance in a drug free zone. At most, the facts 
adduced would have supported a plea for attempted possession of a controlled substance. 
The trial court's acceptance of defendant's guilty plea and its denial of defendant's timely 
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motion to withdraw that plea appear to have been predicated upon an erroneous 
interpretation of the term "distribute" as that term is used in Utah Code Ann. §58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii) (1998). Properly viewed in the light of a correct interpretation of §58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii), defendant's acts are, as a matter of law, insufficient to support his conviction. 
This Court should therefore hold that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion 
to withdraw his plea and reverse defendant's conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S TIMELY 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WAS AN ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THERE WAS NO FACTUAL BASIS 
TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION 
Defendant's timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on his claim that he 
was not in fact guilty of the charged offense should have been granted because the facts 
recited on the record in support of defendant's conviction were not, as a matter of law, 
sufficient to support defendant's guilty plea. The trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to withdraw his plea was therefore an abuse of discretion. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT HAD A DUTY TO ENSURE 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWING AND 
VOLUNTARY BY ADDUCING A FACTUAL BASIS TO 
SUPPORT THE PLEA. 
It is well-established that "before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must develop 
a factual basis upon which to base a conviction of the charged crime." State v. 
Breckenridge. 688 P.2d 440,443 (Utah 1983). Accord Willett v. Barnes. 842 P.2d 860, 
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861 (Utah 1992) (quoting Breckenridge with approval). The requirement that the trial 
court adduce a factual basis supporting a conviction before accepting a guilty plea is of 
paramount importance because "[c]oncern for the legitimacy or truth of a guilty plea is an 
integral part of ascertaining the voluntariness of that plea." Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 
444. In other words, "because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal 
criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an 
understanding of the law in relation to the facts." McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 
459, 466, (1969) (footnote omitted). Hence, trial courts must adduce a factual basis for 
satisfying each element of the offense before accepting a guilty plea. As demonstrated 
below, the sparse and undisputed facts that were recited below during defendant's guilty 
plea colloquy and in his statement in advance of the plea do no support a conviction for 
"arranging to distribute marijuana, a controlled substance, in a drug free zone, a second 
degree felony" (R. 1; R. 71 at 16). 
B. THE FACTS ADDUCED BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOW 
ONLY THAT DEFENDANT OFFERED TO BUY $100 
WORTH OF MARIJUANA FROM AN UNDERCOVER 
OFFICER AND THAT DEFENDANT ULTIMATELY 
REFUSED TO COMPLETE THE TRANSACTION. 
The defendant's statement in advance of plea contains no factual account of the 
events leading to defendant's arrest or a factual basis for his conviction of the charged 
offense (R. 11-18). The closest passage to a "factual statement" is included under 
paragraph 9 of the statement, which explains that if the case were to go to trial the State 
would have "the burden of proving what are called 'elements' of the charge against 
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[defendant]" (R. 16). The "elements" of the charged offense are then summarized as 
follows: 
A. That I, Ernest Sinju; 
B. in Utah County, State of Utah; 
C. on or about Oct. 2,1997; 
D. arranged to distribute marijuana knowingly. 
(R. 16). 
The recitation of the elements that the State would be required to prove if 
defendant elected to go to trial, however, is merely a series of legal conclusions. It cannot 
be characterized as an account of defendant's conduct let alone a "factual basis" for 
defendant's plea to arranging the distribution of a controlled substance in a drug free zone 
-- particularly since no mention is even made of the charged offense having occurred 
within a drug free zone. 
The only other opportunity the trial court had to adduce a factual basis for 
defendant's plea was when the plea was taken. Specifically, at defendant's arraignment, 
defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing and accepted a plea agreement 
offered by the State (R. 21-22; R. 71 at 3-5). At the hearing, the trial judge adduced the 
following facts: 
The Court: May I have a factual basis for the charge? 
Mr. Jube: Your Honor, on October 2nd, or thereabouts, 1997, officers from the 
Major Crimes Task Force, had at least a couple of meetings with the 
defendant in a vehicle here in Utah County, Utah. During at least one of 
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those meetings there was a discussion about the purchase of marijuana. 
The defendant indicated that he would like to purchase some marijuana 
from them. They went and got some marijuana from one of the undercover 
officers or others in the crime task force, and brought that back to the 
defendant, at which point there was discussion about him taking that 
marijuana or accepting that marijuana for some type of payment. 
(Further discussions between the Defendant and Mr. Killpack.) 
Mr. Killpack: Tell us what happened. 
Defendant: Can I explain what happened? 
The Court: Sure, go ahead. 
Defendant: Okay. This guy named Dave, he's claiming to know my brother's 
name. So I went to make a phone call. I saw him making a phone call, too. 
So I was having this conversation. He asked me what happened. I told 
him, th[at] I was beat up. I told him this friend I know — and nobody know 
about this. They told me if I report to the police they kill me. So I told 
him I'm scared of this person. And so what I'm thinking, I call the police, 
ask the police: ["]Can I buy a gun?["] The police say, ["]yes, you can buy a 
gun if you have no felony. ["] What I tell them is I planning to report these 
guys to the police, and I have a gun for protection. He say no, don't buy 
any gun — 
The Court: Tell me about the marijuana. 
Defendant: That's how it started for the marijuana. He told me that he has 
somebody coming from Vegas who is a professional killer — 
Mr. Killpack: You're getting of the subject. 
Defendant: They ask me to give them some money. I tell them no. I want to 
buy marijuana. They say forget about marijuana, this is important. I say 
forget it. They say I can get it for you. They went and bought it, and I say, 
"oh, you guys take forever." I hide my 100 dollar. Just because they say 
we get it, I say, "no, I can't afford it. I got it from somebody else." They 
look at me like that — 
The Court: But at any rate, you did indicate to them, when they said they could 
get you some, you said go ahead and get it. 
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Defendant: Yeah, I said that. 
The Court: That's arranging to distribute; okay? 
Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: All right, if it is your intent to enter a plea of guilty to the charge, I 
would ask that you sign the statement at this time. 
(R. 71 at 13-15). See Addendum A. 
Defendant then signed the statement in advance of plea; the trial court concluded 
defendant knew and understood his rights and that he was knowingly, intentionally and 
voluntarily waiving his rights by pleading guilty (R. 71 at 15-16). The trial court then 
asked defendant for his plea: 
[The Court:] Mr. Sinju, to the charge contained in the information, Count III, 
arranging to distribute marijuana, a controlled substance, in a drug free 
zone, a second degree felony, what is your plea; guilty or not guilty? 
Defendant: Guilty. 
The Court: A plea of guilty is received and accepted by the court. 
(R. 71 at 16). See Addendum A. 
Defendant does not contest the accuracy of the facts relied upon by the trial court 
in accepting defendant's plea. Defendant questions only whether the facts adduced were 
sufficient to support his plea to the charged offense. 
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C. EVEN IF CRIMINAL, DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO BUY 
MARIJUANA AND HIS SUBSEQUENT REFUSAL TO 
COMPLETE THE PROPOSED TRANSACTION DO NOT 
SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR ARRANGING TO 
DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG 
FREE ZONE. 
The problem with the factual basis for defendant's plea of guilty to the second 
degree felony charge of arranging to distribute a controlled substance in a drug free zone 
is two-fold. First, and most obviously, there is absolutely no factual description of where 
the alleged crime occurred in relation to a drug free zone, such as within 1,000 feet of a 
school, playground or church, as is required under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(4) in order 
for the degree of conviction to be enhanced. Therefore, even assuming the remaining 
facts recited were sufficient to support a charge of arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance ~ a third degree felony, there was no factual basis to support acceptance of the 
plea for arranging to distribute a controlled substance within a drug free zone — a second 
degree felony. On that basis alone, defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his 
guilty plea to charged offense. Second, and of more fundamental importance, the facts 
adduced by the trial court do not support a conviction of arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance. Indeed, the trial court's acceptance of defendant's guilty plea 
appears to have been predicated upon an incorrect interpretation of §58—37-8(l)(a)(ii). 
1. The Trial Court Incorrectly Interpreted the Requirements for 
Obtaining a Conviction Under the "Arranging the Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance" Provision of Section §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii). 
In this context, resolution of whether the facts adduced by the trial court were 
10 
sufficient to support defendant's plea to arranging the distribution of a controlled 
substance first requires an examination of the meaning of "distribute" under Utah Code 
Ann. §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) in light of the intent and purpose of the act. This question of 
statutory interpretation ~ though not expressly treated as such by the trial court - is a 
question of law that is reviewed de novo without deference to the trial court. See, e.g., 
Mariemont Corp. v. White Citv Water Improvement. 341 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1998) 
("Because it is our role as an appellate court to define what the law is, and because the 
operation of statutes must be uniform throughout the state, we accord the district court no 
deference and review its ruling [on matters of statutory interpretation] for correctness.") 
(citations omitted). However, once the statute's meaning is defined, the question of 
whether the trial court properly determined that the facts adduced supported a conviction 
under the statute is essentially a sufficiency of the evidence issue. In order to prevail on 
appeal, defendant must therefore marshal all of the evidence supporting the trial court's 
ruling, which defendant has done above, and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient as a matter of law. See generally State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 (Utah 
App. 1992) (explaining marshaling requirement for challenging a jury's verdict of guilty). 
In accepting defendant's guilty plea and in denying defendant's motion to 
withdraw that plea, the trial court implicitly determined that defendant's slated intent to 
purchase $100 worth of marijuana from an undercover agent and allowing the agent an 
opportunity to pick up the drugs for sale to defendant was sufficient to satisfy the 
elements of "arranging the distribution of a controlled substance." The trial court's 
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reasoning is contrary to the language of §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) as its terms are defined in title 
58 and reasonably interpreted in light of the purpose of the act considered as a whole. 
In construing a statute, an appellate Court's primary purpose "is to give effect to 
the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." 
Mariemont 341 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
"When examining a statute, [an appellate court] first look[s] at its plain language, {the 
court] need not go beyond the plain language unless [it] find[s] that language 
ambiguous." Id, (citations omitted). Furthermore, "if doubt or uncertainty exists as tot he 
meaning or application of an act's provisions, the court should analyze the act in its 
entirety and harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and 
purpose." IcL (citations omitted). In other words, "[t]he meaning or a part of an act 
should harmonize with the purpose of the whole act. Separate parts of an act should not 
be construed in isolation from the rest of the act." Id (citations omitted). Construed in 
light of its plain language and in harmony with related provisions of title 58, the relevant 
portion of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) prohibits a person from knowingly or 
intentionally facilitating the delivery, sale or transfer of a controlled substance between 
two third parties. 
The pertinent portions of §58-37-8(1) read as follows: 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
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(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute^] . . . 
To understand the meaning of "arranging the distribution of a controlled 
substance," this Court must look to the definitions section of title 58. Section 58-37-2(n) 
defines "distribute" as follows: 
"Distribute" means to deliver other than by administering or 
dispensing a controlled substance or a listed chemical. 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-2(n) (1998). 
The term "deliver" or "delivery" is further defined as requiring "the actual, 
constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether 
or not an agency relationship exists." Utah Code Ann. §58-37-2(i) (1998). 
Fairly construed in light of the definitions of "distribution" and "deliver," the 
provision of 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) that prohibits "arranging] the distribution of a controlled 
substance" must be read to require a defendant to take some action that facilitates the 
transfer, sale or delivery of a controlled substance between two third parties — a seller and 
a buyer — as opposed to simply trying to secure a controlled substance for his own 
personal use. That interpretation of the arranging provision is logical because violations 
of subsection 8(1) carry more harsh penalties than do violations of subsection 8(2). The 
difference in severity of punishment for violations of the two provisions is reasonable 
because subsection 8(1) is aimed at those criminals who promote illegal drug use by 
participating in the drug industry while subsection 8(2) is aimed primarily at those 
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defendants who merely possess illegal drugs for their own use. Because title 58 is 
structured to punish those who seek to profit from the drug trade more harshly than 
individuals who merely possess or use drugs without distributing drugs to others, the 
"arranging" provision §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) must be aimed at ensnaring those individuals 
involved in the drug trade who — without directly participating in the sale or delivery 
(transfer) of a controlled substance — facilitate or "arrange" such transactions. 
For instance, it is not uncommon for a drug dealer to negotiate the terms of a drug 
transaction with a potential drug buyer and then, rather than personally executing the 
transaction, have a third person (often a minor) complete the transaction by collecting the 
money from the buyer and then delivering the drugs. This procedure is employed in an 
effort to insulate the adult drug dealer from prosecution by ensuring that he never 
personally distributes the illegal drugs. The arranging provision of subsection (ii) closes 
that potential loophole and makes behind the scene operatives of the drug trade (often the 
real source of power and control) liable to at least the same degree as those lower echelon 
players of the drug industry who actually complete individual transactions. 
By accepting defendant's guilty plea to a second degree felony, the trial court 
inappropriately treated defendant as a player within the drug trade rather than as a mere 
drug user. As demonstrated below, defendant should have been charged with either a 
class B or class C misdemeanor for attempted possession of a controlled substance. He 
should not have been permitted to plead guilty to a second degree felony under §58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii). 
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2. Defendant Did Not "Arrange the Distribution" of Marijuana 
Because He Did Not Facilitate Its Sale or Transfer Between Parties-
In this case, defendant did not facilitate the transfer, sale or delivery of a controlled 
substance between two third parties. Instead, defendant, at worst, attempted to purchase 
an amount of marijuana for his own personal use. The provision that was applicable to 
defendant's conduct was therefore not the "arranging" provision of §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii). 
Instead, defendant should have been charged, if at all, with attempted possession of a 
controlled substance as prohibited under Utah Code Ann. §§58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 58-37-
8(6) (1998). Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) reads as follows: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection[.] 
The facts adduced show that defendant merely offered to purchase $100 worth of 
marijuana (the equivalent of about an ounce of marijuana depending upon its quality) 
from an undercover police officer and that he refused to complete the transaction when 
the officer returned with the drugs. Had defendant completed the transaction, he would 
have been in possession of approximately an once of marijuana — conduct amounting to 
either a class A misdemeanor under §58-37-8(2)(b)(iii) or a class B misdemeanor under 
§58-37-8(2)(e). Because the transaction was not completed, even assuming defendant's 
conduct gave rise to a criminal charge of attempted possession, the degree of conviction 
would be reduced by one degree to either a class B or class C misdemeanor under §58-37-
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8(6). In sum, nothing in the record suggests that defendant was a player in the drug trade 
as opposed to a mere drug user looking to buy drugs for his personal use. Certainly, the 
record does not indicate that defendant orchestrated the transfer, sale or delivery of a 
controlled substance between a seller and a buyer. Defendant's guilty plea under 
subsection 8(1 )(a) should therefore have been refused and the State directed to consider 
the applicability of §58-37-8(2) to defendant's conduct. 
Instead of recognizing defendant's conduct for what it was — an attempt to buy a 
relatively small quantity of marijuana for personal use — the trial court implicitly adopted 
a tortured construction of the arranging provision of §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) that cannot be 
harmonized with the whole of title 58. Moreover, the trial court did so despite 
defendant's obvious misgivings about whether his conduct gave rise to the charged 
offense. Indeed, a review of the hearing at which defendant's plea was accepted shows 
that defendant was raising red flags about the propriety of his pleading guilty to the 
charge of arranging to distribute marijuana: 
Defendant: I want to look into this case one more time [to see] if I'm guilty. I 
mean this is ridiculous. I don't really understand. I am not an attorney, but 
I can't expect somebody to entrap me to do something that wasn't right. 
When I went and think about this, I refused [to buy the marijuana] and got 
arrested. It hurts me right here. So if we can at least try to judge this case 
one more time, I would like this case to be dismissed instead of serve 90 
days. 
The Court: If that is your preference, then you should not enter into the 
agreement at this time. If you're not willing to enter a plea of guilty to the 
arranging to distribute marijuana charge, why then you should not enter into 
the agreement. 
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Defendant: I didn't buy marijuana, your honor. I refused this. 
Mr. Jube: I'm not sure we're creating a record that would stand on appeal 
anyway. Maybe we ought to have a preliminary hearing. 
(Discussions between the Defendant and Mr. Killpack.) 
Mr. Killpack: As I explained to you, the time for negotiating is now. It's just a 
matter of whether you want to go forward or not. You're not charged with 
selling or distributing. You are charged with arranging [the distribution of 
marijuana]. I explained that. If you feel you're not guilty of the arranging, 
then we should proceed. 
Defendant: I'll go for it. 
Mr. Killpack: Do you want to take my recommendation then? 
Defendant: I will take it. 
Mr. Killpack: Do you understand the difference between actually selling and 
arranging as we discussed here a moment ago? 
Defendant: Yeah. 
Mr. Killpack: Okay. 
(R. 71 at 6-7); See Addendum A. 
Though not a model of clarity, defendant's request that the charge against him be 
dismissed plainly put the trial court and counsel on notice of the fact that defendant 
doubted that his actions supported a conviction for a second degree felony. While it 
appears defendant's appointed counsel attempted to explain the difference between 
"selling or distributing" marijuana and "arranging to distribute" marijuana, there is no 
probing analysis of the terms "arranging" or "distribution" on the record or a discussion 
of the elements of the charged offense. On the contrary, what appears on the record is the 
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trial court's blunt assertion to defendant that his conduct constituted "arranging to 
distribute" (R. 71 at 15). Without any elaboration or analysis of why defendant's conduct 
supported a conviction for the charged offense, the trial court effectively told defendant 
he was as good as convicted and that he should plead guilty. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
defendant succumbed and entered a guilty plea. 
Defendant, with virtually no help from his appointed counsel apparent on the 
record, timely moved to withdraw his guilty plea because he remained convinced that his 
actions did not support his conviction for a second degree felony. Again without 
explanation and apparently without the benefit of briefing or argument by either the State 
or defendant's appointed counsel, the trial court summarily denied defendant's motion in 
the same order that it entered judgement against defendant (R. 31). This Court should 
hold that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was an 
abuse of discretion because the guilty plea should never have been accepted in the first 
since there was no factual basis adduced to support defendant's conviction.1 
1
 This Court could also properly reverse defendant's conviction on the grounds that 
defendant's appointed counsel was ineffective. Specifically, had it not been for defense 
counsel's erroneous advice that defendant's actions supported a conviction for the 
charged offense, defendant would not have entered a plea of guilty. See Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994) (a defendant may challenge a guilty plea on 
appeal based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and the conviction should be 
reversed it the defendant can show "'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial'") 
(quoting Hill v. Lockhart. 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). In the face of defendant's repeated 
expressions of doubt about whether his conduct amounted to a second degree felony, 
defendant's appointed counsel failed to properly analyze the charge against defendant and 
(continued...) 
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Finally, even assuming this Court were to determine defendant's conduct is 
covered under the arranging provision, nothing in the record establishes a factual basis for 
enhancing the offense to a second degree felony under §58-37-8(4) because absolutely no 
facts were presented show defendant's actions occurred in a drug free zone. On that basis 
alone, defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Moreover, even 
assuming this Court finds that §58-37-8(1) was applicable, because defendant's conduct 
was likewise prohibited under §58-37-8(2), defendant should have been charged under 
the latter provision because it carries a lower penalty. See State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 
1292 (Utah 1982) ("Where two statutes prohibit identical conduct but impose different 
penalties, an accused is entitled to be charged under the statute entailing the less sever 
punishment." (citations omitted)). Because defendant consistently questioned whether his 
conduct gave rise to a second degree felony conviction, his timely motion to withdraw his 
plea should have been granted. Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
^...continued) 
improperly advised defendant to plead guilty. It is apparent that, had it not been for 
counsel's deficient performance, defendant would have insisted on going to trial. 
Alternatively, had appointed counsel researched the law and submitted a memorandum 
supporting defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, it is likely that the trial court 
would have recognized that defendant's plea was flawed and remedied the situation by 
granting defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This Court would therefore be 
justified in reversing defendant's conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
The facts adduced in support of defendant's guilty plea do not support his 
conviction for arranging to distribute a controlled substance within a drug free zone as 
prohibited under Utah Code Ann. §§58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) and -8(4). This Court should 
therefore reverse defendant's conviction. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND PUBLICATION OF OPINION 
Counsel respectfully asks that this matter be set for oral argument. The question of 
how the arranging provision of §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) should be construed is an important 
issue on which oral argument would be beneficial. Also, because defendant is a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States and a citizen of Cameroon, defendant faces 
deportation if this conviction is upheld on appeal. In light of the severity of the degree of 
conviction entered against defendant and the grave collateral consequence of deportation, 
defendant desires oral argument to ensure that every opportunity to persuade this Court to 
reverse defendant's conviction is exhausted. 
Counsel also requests that this Court announce its decision in an opinion 
designated "For Official Publication." Counsel is aware that there have been other cases 
in which defendants have been charged under §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) for conduct similar to 
defendant's. While the trial courts in some of those cases either dismissed the charge or 
directed to the State to amend the information to conform to the evidence, other cases 
have moved forward and resulted in guilty pleas or pleas to lesser offenses. In at least 
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one case, the matter went to trial and was dismissed only after the trial court determined 
at the close of the State's case-in-chief that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a 
conviction for arranging to distribute a controlled substance. In light of those 
circumstances, it appears that the district courts and members of the bar could benefit 
from a published interpretation of the "arranging to distribute" provision of §58-37-8(1). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ d a y of October, 1998. 
ISHOLA, UTZINGER & PERRETTA 
Q^ CttZ^ 
TODD U T ^ l l ^ R 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Friday, October 31, 1997 
THE COURT: Counsel, it's my understanding 
that your client wishes to waive his right to a 
preliminary hearing and proceed to have the court take a 
plea at this time as a result of a plea bargain; is that 
correct? 
MR. KILLPACK: Judge, I'm not sure whether or 
not it's correct. I would like a chance to discuss that 
just a minute on the record, if we could. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KILLPACK: I have advised Mr. Sinju, 
there is an offer of settlement that would involve the 
Defendant's plea of guilty to Count III in exchange for 
the State's dismissal of Counts I and II. The state has 
also been willing to recommend a 90 day jail time. This 
is a first offense for him, coupled with deportation 
thereafter, immediately thereafter. 
Mr. Sinju is willing to go forward on that 
basis if he could serve a total of 90 days, and of 
course I have explained to him, first, we don't bind the 
court here; the only agreement we can make is with the 
State. And secondly, I have advised the court --or 
excuse me, Mr. Sinju, after consultation with the Court 
and counsel for the State, I am confident that he will 
receive credit for time served; so that the amount of 
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time he would serve total, in all likelihood on this 
case as far as I can predict how the outcome would be, 
would be 90 days. 
The defendant has some reservations on that, 
because he doesn't understand -- or he indicates his 
concern that the court may, at sentencing, impose a 
greater period of time. 
THE COURT: Let me suggest to you that the 
only reason the court would alter your plea agreement, 
from my perspective, would be should the presentence 
investigative report determine that he has a criminal 
record that has not been disclosed to the court, and 
that that would justify the court in imposing a sentence 
beyond that which you have agreed to plea to. 
MR. KILLPACK: You have no other criminal 
record do you? 
THE DEFENDANT: I donft. 
MR. KILLPACK: The Judge is indicating it 
would be his position to give you the 90 days and credit 
for time served. 
THE DEFENDANT: 90 days? 
THE COURT: 90 days. 
THE DEFENDANT: I go back to jail, I would be 
two months more, including the one Ifve been in? 
THE COURT: 90 days total from the time of 
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your arrest. 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't do more than that; is 
that correct? 
THE COURT: Well, if what you're telling me 
is true, that you have no other criminal record. 
THE DEFENDANT: They can look into the 
record. 
THE COURT: They're going to do that. 
MR. KILLPACK: If they do that and confirm 
what you say, that will be the outcome. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay, yeah, go for it. 
THE COURT: Would you like to step forward? 
MR. KILLPACK: Judge, his initials have not 
been affixed to each paragraph, although I have been 
over each one of them with him and he understands each 
of them. Mr. Jube and myself have both affixed our 
signatures there, and I also have a signed affidavit. 
Would you like him to sign each paragraph? 
THE COURT: He needn't. We'll proceed 
without that, and I'll examine him regarding it. 
May we have his right-hand unshackled. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I ask a question? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
THE DEFENDANT: I can? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
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THE DEFENDANT: I want to look into this case 
one more time if Ifm guilty. I mean this is ridiculous. 
I donft really understand. I am not a attorney, but I 
can't expect somebody can entrap me to do something that 
wasn't right. When I went and think about this, I 
refused and got arrested. It hurts me right here. So 
if we can at least try to judge this case one more time, 
I would like this case to be dismissed instead of me 
serve 90 days. 
THE COURT: If that is your preference, then 
you should not enter into the agreement at this time. 
If you're not willing to enter a plea of guilty to the 
arranging to distribute marijuana charge, why then you 
should not enter into the agreement. 
THE DEFENDANT: I didn't buy marijuana, your 
Honor. I refused this. 
MR. JUBE: I'm not sure we're creating a 
record that would stand on appeal anyway. Maybe we 
ought to have a preliminary hearing. 
(Discussions between the 
Defendant and Mr. Killpack.) 
MR. KILLPACK: As I explained to you, the 
time for negotiation is now. It's just a matter of 
whether you want to go forward or not. You're not 
charged with selling or distributing. You are charged 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
6 
with arranging. I explained that. If you feel you're 
not guilty of the arranging, then we should proceed. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'll go for it. 
MR. KILLPACK: Do you want to take my 
recommendation then? 
THE DEFENDANT: I will take it. 
MR. KILLPACK: Do you understand the 
difference between actually selling and arranging as we 
discussed here a moment ago? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
MR. KILLPACK: Okay, 
THE COURT: If you111 raise your right-hand, 
the clerk will administer an oath to you. 
ERNEST SINJU 
called as a witness herein, was 
duly sworn, and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in the case now before 
the Court will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: Mr. Killpack, you!ve previously 
received a copy of the information. Do you desire to 
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have it read. 
MR. KILLPACK: No, Judge, we waive that. 
He's been over that in detail. 
THE COURT: And if you'll tell us your true 
and correct name and date of birth. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, my name is Ernest 
Sinju, December 16, 1976. 
THE COURT: And have you had an opportunity 
to read and review the statement by defendant before 
entry of plea with your attorney. 
THE DEFENDANT: Say that one more time. 
THE COURT: Have you had an opportunity to 
read and review that statement with your attorney. 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't go through it --
okay. 
MR. KILLPACK: Are you agreeable to that? 
(Further discussions between the 
defendant and Mr. Killpack.) 
MR. KILLPACK: He's expressed his concern 
about immigration picking him up. I explained to him we 
don't bind immigration authorities here, but I'll do 
everything I can to see they take him at the end of that 
time. 
THE COURT: Do you understand those rights 
that are in that statement? 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
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THE DEFENDANT: The rights that is in the 
statement? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about 
those rights. 
THE DEFENDANT: I truly -- I do. Just to be 
sure, if I plead guilty, I just do the 90 days? 
THE COURT: That's right. 
THE DEFENDANT: Then I will take it. 
THE COURT: Do you realize that if you desire 
to change your plea from that which you're entering into 
today, that you must initiate action to do so by filing 
a written motion with this court within thirty days of 
today's date; do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Say that again. 
THE COURT: If you desire to change your plea 
from that which you're entering today, you must initiate 
action to do so by filing a written motion with this 
court within 3 0 days of today's date? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And you understand that you have 
the right to plead not guilty; do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do understand that. 
THE COURT: And by entering a plea of guilty 
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you're giving up that right? 
THE DEFENDANT: That if I plead guilty I'm 
giving up that right to plead not guilty? 
THE COURT: To plead not guilty. If you're 
going to plead guilty you give up your right to plead 
not guilty. Does that make sense to you? 
THE DEFENDANT: That make sense to me. 
THE COURT: Therefore, you do also give up 
the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self incrimination, the right to a 
speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right 
to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses and the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses; do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand that. 
THE COURT: Are you willing to sign the 
statement at this time and thereby acknowledge that it's 
true and correct and that you understand the rights that 
are stated within that statement, and that you're 
voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally waving those 
rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And do you understand you would 
be giving up the right to appeal which you might 
otherwise have? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that the 
maximum sentence that the law would permit the court to 
sentence you would be not less than 1, nor more than 15 
years in the Utah State Prison? That's what a second 
degree felony would permit me to do. 
THE DEFENDANT: You mean if I plead guilty --
THE COURT: That is a maximum that I could 
do. 
THE DEFENDANT: Is 15 years? 
MR. KILLPACK: Thatfs if you got the maximum. 
That's not what you might get; that's just what's 
possible. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I understand, but 
there's one thing I'm confused. What I'm confused, if I 
plead guilty it means I do thirty days already and be 
sentenced again to same crime? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. KILLPACK: No. As we talked about, 
credit for time served, the time you're waiting will be 
credited towards the amount of time served. The Judge 
doesn't normally do that, but in this case he's 
indicated his intention to do that. 
THE DEFENDANT: For 90 days? 
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MR. KILLPACK: Uh-huh (affirmative), give you 
the credit for the time served. 
THE DEFENDANT: If that is true, I'll take 
it. All I want to do, is not do that 90 days and then 
say since you plead guilty to this we're going to give 
you two years or --
THE COURT: As I've indicated to you, the 
only way that would happen is if there is a criminal 
record you did not disclose to us. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay, judge. 
THE COURT: Have you set forth all of the 
elements in the statement? 
MR. KILLPACK: I have, Judge. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that by 
entering a plea of guilty here today, you are relieving 
the State of its obligation to prove each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury's 
satisfaction? 
THE DEFENDANT: Say that again. 
MR. KILLPACK: He's saying by pleading guilty 
you're not going to trial, and therefore you won't have 
the jurors to decide the case. The judge will decide 
the case. You're giving up your right to go to trial. 
THE DEFENDANT: If I plead guilty then the 
judge is going to decide? 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
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MR. KILLPACK: If you plead guilty there 
won't be a trial. If you plead not guilty, they'll have 
to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If you 
plead guilty you give up those rights. Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: May I have a factual basis for 
the charge? 
MR. JUBE: Your Honor, on October 2nd, or 
thereabouts, 1997, officers from the Major Crimes Task 
Force, had at least a couple meetings with the defendant 
in a vehicle here in Utah County, Utah. During at least 
one of those meetings there was a discussion about the 
purchase of marijuana. The defendant indicated he would 
like to purchase some marijuana from them. They went 
and got some marijuana from one of the undercover 
officers or others in the crime task force, and brought 
that back to the defendant, at which point there was 
discussion about him taking that marijuana or accepting 
that marijuana for some type of payment. 
(Further discussions between the 
Defendant and Mr. Killpack.) 
MR. KILLPACK: Tell us what happened. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I explain what happened? 
THE COURT: Sure, go ahead. 
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THE DEFENDANT: Okay. This guy named Dave, 
he's claiming he know my brother's name. So I went to 
make a phone call. I saw him making a phone call, too. 
So I was having a conversation. He asked me what 
happened. I told him, then I was beat up. I told him 
this friend I know -- and nobody know about this. They 
told me if I report to the police they kill me. So I 
told him I'm scared of this person. And so what I'm 
thinking, I call the police, ask the police: Can I buy 
a gun? The police say, yes, you can buy a gun if you 
have no felony. What I tell them is I planning to 
report these guys to the police, and I have the gun for 
protection. He say no, don't buy any gun --
THE COURT: Tell me about the marijuana. 
THE DEFENDANT: That's how it started for the 
marijuana. He told me that he has somebody coming from 
Vegas who is a professional killer --
MR. KILLPACK: You're getting off the 
subject. 
THE DEFENDANT: They ask me to give them some 
money. I tell them no. I want to buy marijuana. They 
say forget about marijuana, this is important. I say 
forget it. They say I can get it for you. They went 
and bought it, and I say, "oh, you guys take forever." 
I hide my 100 dollar. Just because they say we get it, 
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I say, "no, I can't afford it. I got it from somebody 
else." They look at me like that --
THE COURT: But at any rate, you did indicate 
to them, when they said they could get you some, you 
said go ahead and get it. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I said that. 
THE COURT: That's arranging to distribute; 
okay? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right, if it is your intent 
to enter a plea of guilty to the charge, I would ask 
that you sign the statement at this time. 
MR. KILLPACK: Is that how you sign your 
name? You told me you sign by initials. 
Okay, hefs done so, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court has 
received the affidavit --or the Statement of Defendant 
Before Entry of Plea, and notes the appropriate blanks 
have been filled in. The plea agreement is set forth 
therein, signed by the Defendant and his attorney. The 
statement has been signed by the Defendant, the 
Defendant's attorney and the county attorney. The Court 
is satisfied that the defendant knows and understands 
the rights contained in the statement, and has 
knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily waived the 
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same. And the Court will so certify by signing at this 
time, as well. 
The court further notes the affidavit of 
counsel attached thereto. The statement will be made a 
part of the file. 
Mr. Sinju, to the charge contained in the 
information, Count III, arranging to distribute 
marijuana, a controlled substance, in a drug free zone, 
a second degree felony, what is your plea; guilty or not 
guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: A plea of guilty is received and 
accepted by the court. 
Do you have a motion as to Counts I and II? 
MR. JUBE: Move to dismiss. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. KILLPACK: No, judge. 
THE COURT: Counts I and II are ordered 
dismissed. 
The matter will be referred to the Department 
of Adult Probation and Parole for Presentence 
Investigative Report. The Defendant is to cooperate 
with them and give them the information they request in 
order to assist them in preparing a report for the 
Court's use in sentencing in this case. 
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Sentencing will be set for the 12th of 
December at the hour of 8:00 ofclock a.m., at which time 
the Defendant is ordered to be present. 
MR. KILLPACK: May the minute entry indicate 
that he will be in custody until that time? 
THE COURT: Yes, it may so indicate. 
(Proceedings concluded.) 
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